From Sojourners to Saints: The Making of the Chinese Immigrant Church


A reflection by a 1.5 gen Chinese-American pastor | Part 1 of 3


We did not plan to be a church. We planned to survive.

That instinct, to gather with those who understood us, who shared our language, our food, our loneliness, is older than any of us realized when we first folded metal chairs in a university basement and opened our Bibles. To understand what the Chinese immigrant church is today, we have to trace not one river of history but several: rivers that began at different moments, carried different kinds of people, and flowed through very different American landscapes before they converged in the congregations we now lead and love.

The story begins, as all honest stories about Chinese Christianity in America must, with exclusion.


The First Wave: Sanctuary in a Hostile Land

The earliest Chinese immigrants, the laoqiao, or "old sojourners," were primarily male laborers from rural Guangdong province who arrived during the Gold Rush and the era of transcontinental railroad construction in the mid-1800s (Carnes & Yang, 2004). They arrived into a country that would spend the next several decades trying to legally erase them. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was the nation's first law to bar a specific ethnic group from citizenship. Violence, legal disenfranchisement, and racial terror were not abstract threats; they were the daily conditions of Chinese life in America.

In that climate, the earliest Chinese Protestant churches were not born from missiological strategy. They were missions started by white American denominations, Presbyterians, Methodists, and Baptists, functioning as domestic outposts of foreign mission boards (Eng, 2022). The stated goal was explicitly instrumentalist: to Christianize laborers and prepare them to serve as missionary helpers upon returning to China (Carnes & Yang, 2004). The Chinese person in the pew was, in this framework, primarily a means to an end: a potential conduit for a mission that lay on the other side of the Pacific.

And yet, this is the grace hidden in an ungracious history: those early missions became something their founders did not fully intend. They became havens. They became the one place where Chinese people could receive social services, English instruction, legal aid, and above all, community with people who refused to see them as merely foreign or merely useful (Yang, 1999). The church functioned as an insular sanctuary in a hostile society, and that instinct shaped an ecclesiological reflex that persists in Chinese immigrant churches to this day: the church is where our people are safe.

This first-wave church planted important seeds. It modeled the church as a place of belonging for the displaced. It established Chinese-language worship as legitimate and dignified. But it remained largely confined to Chinatown geography and Cantonese-speaking communities, and it would be a very different kind of Chinese immigrant who transformed the American Chinese church from a defensive enclave into a movement.


The Second Wave: The Campus Bible Study That Became a Church

The real engine of the Chinese immigrant church as we know it today is the xinqiao, the "new sojourners," the highly educated students and professionals who began arriving after the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 abolished the quota system that had severely restricted Asian immigration (Wan & Casey, 2014). These were engineers, scientists, doctors, and graduate students, many from Taiwan and Hong Kong, streaming into American universities with ambitions for PhDs and careers in the sciences. They arrived in a country simultaneously in cultural upheaval, the Civil Rights movement, Vietnam, the counterculture, and they needed anchor.

They found it in campus Bible studies.

The pattern was remarkably consistent across campuses from Iowa City to Berkeley to Cambridge: a few Chinese Christian students would form a small group, often connected to InterVarsity Christian Fellowship or Campus Crusade for Christ, sometimes supported by a nearby Chinese church. The group grew as new students arrived. Graduates settled nearby, began hosting the Bible study in their homes, and, gradually and almost accidentally, a church emerged (Cha, Kang, & Lee, 2006). This "Bible Study Group" (BSG) evolution is the founding narrative of the majority of Chinese immigrant churches in North America today. The campus was the womb; the church was the birth.

What formed in these campus crucibles was a very particular kind of Christianity: evangelical, theologically conservative, and deliberately independent of white denominational control (Yang, 1999). Fenggang Yang, in his landmark study Chinese Christians in America, observes that evangelical values, family loyalty, educational discipline, communal obligation, and moral uprightness found a natural resonance with traditional Confucian ethics, so that conversion to evangelical Christianity felt less like a rupture from Chinese identity and more like a deeper fulfillment of it (Yang, 1999). This fusion proved to be both the genius and the limitation of the Chinese immigrant church in the decades ahead.

To accommodate the linguistic complexity of this wave, Mandarin-speaking Taiwanese, Cantonese-speaking Hong Kongers, and an emerging English-speaking second generation, many churches adopted what scholars call the "Triplex" model: three parallel congregations sharing a single leadership board, facility, and budget, each worshipping in its own language (Chuang, 2016; Cha, Kang, & Lee, 2006). It was a creative and pragmatic solution. It was also the structural seed of the generational fractures that would surface a generation later.


The Third Wave: Refugees, PRC Intellectuals, and the Ark Fellowship

The 1970s and 1980s introduced additional layers of complexity. Ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos arrived bearing trauma that the existing Taiwanese- and Hong Kong-dominated church structures were not always equipped to receive (Carnes & Yang, 2004). Their conversion stories carried a distinctive theological texture: the fragile sampan that survived the open sea became a metanarrative for surviving the unsurvivable, a testimony of divine rescue woven into the immigrant body. For these newcomers, the church was not merely social convenience; it was the theological vocabulary for their very existence.

Then came the PRC intellectuals. Following the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1979, and with greater urgency after the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, large numbers of mainland Chinese scholars and students settled permanently in the United States (Carnes & Yang, 2004; Yang, 1999). These were individuals socialized in state atheism, shaped by a Marxist epistemology that dismissed religious faith as intellectual weakness. The existing evangelical paradigm, with its assumptions of shared cultural sympathy, was ill-fitted for this group.

What emerged in response was the "Ark Fellowship" model: a ministry approach that leaned heavily on rational apologetics, scientific reasoning, and philosophical argument to reach people for whom faith had to be intellectually credible before it could be personally transformative (Yang, 1999). Conversion for many post-Tiananmen intellectuals was inseparable from their political disillusionment. The collapse of Marxist ideological certainty created a spiritual vacuum that Christianity, presented with intellectual rigor, was positioned to fill (Yang, 1999; Cheng, 2023). This was not a rejection of the BSG model but a significant evolution of it, shaped by the specific contours of a new diaspora within the diaspora.

Enoch Wan gave this entire pattern its theological framework: diaspora missiology (Wan & Casey, 2014). The scattering of Chinese peoples across North American universities and suburbs was not a sociological accident to be managed but a providential movement to be embraced. Wan proposed a threefold frame: missions to the diaspora (reaching Chinese immigrants with the gospel), missions through the diaspora (using immigrant communities as platforms for broader witness), and missions by and beyond the diaspora (the diaspora itself becoming a sending force). The Chinese immigrant church was not the destination of mission. It was the vehicle for it.


The Fourth Wave: The Understudied Cohort

This is where the histories usually stop. But there is a fourth wave, largely understudied in both missiological literature and Chinese church pastoral practice, that has been reshaping the landscape of Chinese immigration to North America since the 1990s and accelerating sharply since 2010. It is not monolithic, and the data remain incomplete, but its contours are becoming visible enough to name. Fenggang Yang's foundational sociological study of Chinese Christians in America established that religion functions as an "adhesive identity" for immigrant communities, a mechanism by which Chinese immigrants simultaneously integrate into American society while preserving Chinese cultural values, but the congregational model Yang documented was formed almost entirely by an earlier cohort whose circumstances the fourth wave does not share (Yang, 1999).

The Economic Migrant Cohort

The first cohort within this fourth wave are the post-Cultural Revolution economic migrants: not the intellectual elite of the Tiananmen generation, but the entrepreneurial class that emerged from Deng Xiaoping's market reforms, including business owners, factory managers, real estate investors, and private entrepreneurs who accumulated significant capital in China's economic opening and began moving wealth and families to North America as a hedge against political instability (Cheng, 2023). These immigrants arrive with money but without the ideological disillusionment that made the Tiananmen scholars spiritually receptive. Their relationship to Christianity, when it exists at all, is often instrumental rather than confessional: the church as a social network, a credentialing community, or a cultural orientation service, rather than as a community of genuine faith formation (Cheng, 2023).

Research on mainland Chinese immigrants in Australia confirms this pattern more broadly: settlement crises, not prior conviction, tend to trigger initial religious participation among this demographic, with Christianity functioning primarily as "a strong vehicle to resolve integration difficulties in a new society" rather than as a site of theological transformation (Ip et al., 2022). They are harder to reach than their post-Tiananmen predecessors, and many existing Chinese immigrant churches have struggled to distinguish between genuine conversion and social membership within this group (Cheng, 2023).

The Fu'erdai Cohort

The second cohort is the fu'erdai (富二代) or "second-generation wealthy," the children of China's newly minted economic elite, sent to North American prep schools, universities, and graduate programs to acquire Western credentials and, often, to establish permanent residency as a form of political insurance for their families (Cheng, 2023). Reporting by the Asia Society Policy Institute describes this generation as shaped by conspicuous consumption, institutional entitlement, and a complex form of social isolation that wealth alone cannot resolve (Asia Society Policy Institute, 2025). They arrive young, affluent, and culturally adrift: formed in China's hyper-competitive educational system, disconnected from both traditional Chinese culture and the immigrant community ethos that shaped earlier waves.

The pastoral challenge is visceral. As one Chinese American church leader described it, today's fu'erdai students arrive needing help to get a driver's license; the church assists and then never sees them again: "It is like they have been vaccinated against the church" (China Partnership, 2018). Some do encounter Christianity through campus ministry or Chinese student fellowships and are genuinely transformed by it. Others move through these communities as social participants without theological engagement, and their presence can create significant pastoral confusion about what conversion and discipleship actually require (Cheng, 2023). ChinaSource's analysis of recent student ministry in mainland China confirms that the spiritual formation patterns of this generation differ substantially from those of earlier student cohorts, requiring new pedagogical and relational approaches to evangelism (ChinaSource, 2021).

The Run Wave

The third cohort, emerging most sharply since 2019 and accelerating through Xi Jinping's consolidation of power and the crackdowns associated with COVID-19, are sometimes called the run (润) wave: mainland Chinese professionals, entrepreneurs, and academics who are actively emigrating as a form of political exit (Cheng, 2023). The term run is a transliteration of the English word "run," repurposed as slang for emigration in Chinese social media before being censored (NPR, 2022). According to the Asia Society Policy Institute, the number of Chinese citizens seeking political asylum overseas climbed to 120,000 in 2021, a more than twelvefold increase since the era of Xi's predecessor, Hu Jintao, while U.S. border patrol registered 35,399 Chinese citizens entering through the southern border illegally in the first seven months of 2024 alone, a 15–24 times increase from the Hu era (Ong, 2024).

This group is younger, more politically aware, and more likely to carry specific grievances against the Chinese Communist Party than their predecessors (NPR, 2023). The Equal Times documented that the run movement draws heavily from educated professionals, engineers, academics, and entrepreneurs, whose disillusionment with the party-state is systemic, not episodic (Equal Times, 2024). Their spiritual openness is genuine but complex: distrust of institutions, including religious ones, runs deep, and the church that approaches them primarily as a pipeline for numerical growth rather than as a community of genuine political and spiritual hospitality will lose them quickly.

The Absence of Immigrant Vulnerability

What distinguishes all three cohorts within this fourth wave from the earlier xinqiao and post-Tiananmen scholars is the absence of the shared immigrant struggle that made the campus Bible study so formative. Earlier waves found in the Christian community a solution to a real and acute problem: loneliness, cultural disorientation, and the need for social infrastructure in a strange land. Yang (1999) documented this dynamic extensively: the Chinese immigrant church became a surrogate ethnic community precisely because earlier immigrants arrived with structural needs that the church was uniquely positioned to meet. Many fourth-wave immigrants, particularly the fu'erdai and economic migrants, arrive with sufficient financial resources to construct parallel lives that do not require the church for social survival (Cheng, 2023).

Transnational Chinese Christianity scholarship corroborates this shift: where earlier immigrants relied on native-place and kinship networks embedded in church community, newer arrivals increasingly maintain transnational social connections that do not require a local congregation as their hub (Lim & Wu, 2024). The church must earn its engagement rather than simply receive it as a byproduct of immigrant vulnerability (Cheng, 2023). A 2025 dissertation studying mainland Chinese Christian scholars in the Twin Cities found that this demographic's departure from the church followed patterns of institutional distrust and unmet intellectual expectations, a warning sign that many established congregations are not yet equipped to address (Ma, 2025).

Missiological Implications

The missiological implications of this fourth wave for existing Chinese immigrant churches are significant and deserve far more attention than they have received. Most established Taiwanese- or Cantonese-background congregations were not built to reach these populations, and the social and theological gap between a congregation formed by the Bible Study Group tradition and a fu'erdai student at a private university is at least as large as the gap between that same congregation and its own second-generation children (Yang, 1999; Cheng, 2023). Missio Nexus reports that Chinese church leaders are now targeting the sending of 20,000 cross-cultural workers by 2030, a missional ambition that implicitly acknowledges the inadequacy of existing congregational structures for reaching new populations, including diaspora populations in North America itself (Fulton, 2025).

The Ark Fellowship model, patient, intellectually rigorous, apologetics-intensive, may offer the most transferable framework for engagement, but it requires pastoral competency and institutional patience that many plateaued congregations are not currently positioned to offer (Yang, 1999; Cheng, 2023). Tseng's historical analysis of Chinese North American Protestant institutions identifies a recurring pattern in which congregations built to serve one immigrant cohort fail to adapt their structures when a new wave arrives, perpetuating generational rupture across the arc of Chinese American church history (Tseng, 2012). The fourth wave is not a rescue plan for the Chinese immigrant church's generational crisis. It is a distinct missional challenge that deserves to be met on its own terms, with clear eyes, adequate research, and the theological honesty to admit that numerical replenishment is not the same thing as genuine discipleship.


The HUP Trap and the Seeds of Exodus

McGavran's Homogeneous Unit Principle (HUP), the claim that the gospel spreads most effectively among people of common culture, language, and social networks, describes precisely what the BSG-to-church pipeline was doing, whether its leaders knew it or not (Jeung, 2004). The first-generation immigrant congregation was, structurally, a HUP machine. Newcomers arrived, connected immediately with people who looked and sounded like them, heard the gospel in their heart language, and found a sense of belonging in a community that understood their specific disorientation. It worked. Chinese immigrant churches multiplied rapidly through the 1970s, 80s, and 90s.

The problem was the children.

The 1.5 generation, those who immigrated as children and were shaped by both Chinese family culture and American schooling, and the second generation, those born in America to Chinese immigrant parents, were forming in a world their parents did not fully inhabit. They spoke English fluently. They navigated American institutions daily. They carried questions of racial and ethnic identity that their immigrant parents often found threatening or simply incomprehensible (Lee, 2022; Shin & Silzer, 2016). And yet, Sunday by Sunday, they sat in churches whose entire gravitational center was the new arrival, whose pastoral imagination was oriented toward reaching people more like the xinqiao than the American teenagers in the youth group.

The spiritual formation of the 1.5 and second generation was, in too many congregations, incidental rather than central. Youth programs existed, but they often served as holding environments, places to keep children occupied while the "real" ministry took place in the Chinese-language adult congregation (Cha, Kang, & Lee, 2006). The cultural formation these young people received was layered and contradictory: honor the community that sacrificed for you, but succeed in the American academy; be faithful to your parents' way of being Chinese, but navigate an American world that categorizes you differently than your parents see themselves. There was rarely a pastor theologically equipped or institutionally empowered to hold that tension with them.

The structural response that emerged, the "Townhouse" model, attempted to address this by giving English-speaking congregations their own budget, constitution, and a degree of organizational autonomy within the shared facility of the immigrant mother church (Chuang, 2016). Better in theory than in practice: the English Ministry pastor often carried the pastoral burden without institutional authority, operated on underfunded budgets, and perpetually negotiated space, physical, theological, and relational, with a first-generation leadership board that held the real power (Tow, 2008).

In 1996, Christianity Today writer Helen Lee named what was happening: the Silent Exodus (Lee, 1996). At an alarming rate, young people who had grown up in ethnic Asian churches were leaving, not merely for other congregations but for no church at all. Studies in subsequent years suggested that 70% to 80% of American-born Chinese raised in immigrant churches eventually departed those churches (Cha, Kang, & Lee, 2006; Li, 2020). Some went to multiethnic evangelical megachurches. Some found pan-Asian congregations that felt more culturally legible. Many simply stopped attending altogether (Jeung, 2004).


The Pan-Asian Turn and the Incomplete Reckoning

Out of the Silent Exodus emerged a new paradigm. English-speaking pastors began leaving immigrant churches not in defeat but in deliberate church planting, establishing congregations designed to be culturally resonant for Americanized Asians (Chuang, 2016; Jeung, 2004). These "Church Plant" congregations were autonomous, English-medium, and oriented toward a pan-Asian rather than specifically Chinese identity. Russell Jeung's research documents how these congregations moved away from specific ethnic loyalties toward a broader collective identity shaped by shared experiences of racialization in America more than by shared ancestry (Jeung, 2004).

More recently, a further paradigm has emerged: the multi-Asian or multiethnic model, led largely by Gen X and Millennial pastors who prioritize racial reconciliation, target diverse urban neighborhoods, and seek to embody a vision of the church as a foretaste of the new creation rather than a refuge for a single ethnic community (Jeung, 2004; Lee, 2022). DJ Chuang's MultiAsian.Church articulates this vision compellingly, arguing that the bicultural heritage of next-generation Asian Americans uniquely positions them to lead churches that transcend ethnic boundaries and speak to the multiethnic American city (Chuang, 2016).

These newer paradigms carry genuine theological vitality. But they also represent, in some ways, an incomplete reckoning with the original diaspora. The first-generation Chinese immigrant church, the BSG turned congregation, the Triplex, the aging building on the commercial street of a suburban American city, is not simply a stage to be moved past. It is the community that carried the gospel, at real cost, through the specific ruptures of migration and displacement. It is the community in which most of us who now lead newer and more "relevant" churches first encountered Jesus.

Wan's diaspora missiology refuses to allow us simply to move on (Wan & Casey, 2014). The scattering was not an accident. The specific form of the Chinese immigrant church, born in crisis, shaped by exclusion, refined through campus Bible study and potluck evangelism, was a vessel for something larger than itself. The question now pressing on every Chinese immigrant congregation, in every paradigm and at every stage of its life cycle, is whether we have the theological honesty to acknowledge both what the vessel carried faithfully and what it, in its very success, failed to pass on.

That is the question this series is written to hold.


Continue reading: Part 2 — Gray Temples, Empty Pews: What Does Faithfulness Look Like Now?


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